The same project, delivered the other way
Same vehicles, same vendor, same plant. Delivered this way the payback is
2.6 years. Delivered the other way it is
10.7 years, and the capex barely moves.
Every choice in the second column is defensible in the room. Take the scope the board
asked for. Put the hazard behind the biggest barrier available. Trust the vendor's
datasheet. Send the staffing question to HR. Widen a tolerance that is rejecting pallets.
Go live on everything at once, on the date you promised. What moves is production lost
while installing and cutting over into an operation that cannot stop. The business case
was built on labour savings of €160,000 a year, and the production lost in the second
column is worth more than 8 years of them.
The lesson
The delivery method is the business case. That is the whole lesson, and it is the one I did not properly understand until I watched a project like this go wrong.
A payback case built on labour savings is a thin thing. €160,000 a year is about €3,000 a week. So a single shift lost across five lines, caused by your own installation or your own cutover, costs more than a month of the benefit you are there to deliver. A fortnight of disruption costs more than three years of it. And it does not appear anywhere in your capex tracking, because lost production lands in the plant's number, not the project's.
I have seen a rollout of this shape take its payback from months to years on exactly that: production lost while it was being installed and switched on. No overspend, no technology failure. The capex came in fine. The project still destroyed its own case.
In a plant that cannot stop, three things become the project:
Sequence so there is always an unaffected line. The board's instinct is to do everything at once because it looks efficient. Installing across the whole cold end simultaneously means every line takes disruption together and nothing is left to carry the plant. Phasing is what keeps the loss bounded when something goes wrong, and something will.
Never remove the manual route until the automated one has proven itself. This is the single decision that separates the two columns above. Once the corridor is reconfigured for automated traffic and the forklifts cannot easily take back over, an ordinary one-hour fault turns into lost production on every line behind it. Keeping the old route rigged and drivable costs almost nothing and converts every unknown from a loss into an inconvenience.
Hold contingency for production impact as well as capex. Every project holds a cash contingency. Almost none hold a production contingency, and on a site like this that is the exposure that is an order of magnitude larger. If you cannot say what a day of lost output on your busiest line costs, you cannot price any of your own delivery decisions.
The other four calls in the run matter and I would defend each of them: sequencing the scope instead of cutting it, putting the hard safety control where a survey said the people were, giving the drivers the real 54% instead of the notice board's 70%, and fixing a shrink tunnel the automation had just exposed. None of them would have saved this project from a big bang go-live. That one decision was worth more than the other six put together.
The criticism you would still take: one route live out of five. The answer is that the other four are costed and sequenced in the capex round, and this one paid back. That is a better position than five routes and a plant number nobody wants to discuss.
Where the AI was
Each of the seven calls above has an analysis behind it, drafted with AI in under an hour.
None of them made a decision. Two were wrong in ways that mattered: the corridor model averaged 214 pedestrian transits that were really two spikes a shift, and the network options table repeated a vendor's word "supported" without the eight-second number underneath it that made the feature useless to us. Both were caught by going and looking: four shifts with a counter, and one direct question to the vendor.
That is the job now. The analysis is cheap, so the value moved to framing the question, knowing which inputs are missing, and owning the call.
Nothing here identifies a site. The layout is a composite of container glass plants, and
the plant, the people and the vendor are fictional. The constraints and the failure modes
are real.